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EMPATHY, LEGAL STORYTELLING, AND
THE RULE OF LAW: NEW WORDS,
OLD WOUNDS?t
Toni M. Massaro*
"[T]he object of a law is always general .... [A] law always considers
the subjects collectively and actions abstractly, never an individual person or a particular action. Thus the law can declare that there will be
privileges, but it cannot give them to anyone by name ...." 1

I.

THE TREND

A. Introduction: The Problem and the Contemporary
Terminology Outlined
The legal storytelling theme that is the focus of this symposium is
part of a larger, ongoing intellectual movement. American legal scholarship of the past several decades has revealed deep dissatisfaction
with the abstract and collective focus of law and legal discourse. The
rebellion against abstraction has, of late, been characterized by a "call
to context." 2 One strand of this complex body of thought argues that
law should concern itself more with the concrete lives of persons affected by it. One key word in the dialogue is the term "empathy,"
which appears frequently in the work of critical legal studies, feminist,
and "law and literature" writers. 3

t
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* Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S. 1977, Northwestern; J.D. 1980, William and
Mary. - Ed. I thank Francis Allen, Stuart Cohn, Jeffrey Harrison, Fred Schauer, Ted
Schneyer, and Joan Shaughnessy for valuable critiques of earlier versions of this essay. I also
thank Raymond Van Dyke, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, for excellent research
assistance.
1. J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE EsSENTIAL ROUSSEAU 34 {L. Blair trans.
1983).
2. The phrase "call to context" is Professor Schauer's.
3. See, e.g., J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EsSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
THE LAW (1985); Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); West,
Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1987); West, Law,
Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (1986); Yudof, "Tea at the Palace ofHoon": The Human Voice in Legal
Rules, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 589 (1988). More recently, a symposium that addresses these issues
chose "passion" as its key word to represent (roughly) the same concept. Reason, Passion, and
Justice Brennan: A Symposium, IO CARDOZO L. REV. 1 passim (1988).
Legal writers who appeal to empathy likely are drawing from work in "interpretive sociology," which appeals to the concepts of empathy and interpretation and to subjective meaning as
vehicles for understanding social life. This approach to social life rejects positivist models of
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These scholars applaud Noonan's well-known caution about rules.
He wrote: "Rules are formalized repetition. They enforce a conformity which may be merciless and inhuman. They embody power."4
Legal discourse may exaggerate this tendency in two ways. First,
traditional legal discourse equates logic with "reason" and "understanding." Feminist jurisprudence in particular challenges this equation, and argues that feeling and imagination also are important
aspects of reason and understanding. 5 Second, legal discourse and
legal analysis typically emphasize the use of general, acontextual principles to solve concrete legal problems. Arguments against this approach come from many quarters. 6
Closely related to the empathy theme are arguments in favor of
more individualized justice. Lawyers are encouraged to personalize
their clients - to "tell their story." 7 Legal scholars are invited to use
stories to provoke changes in law teaching, in law scholarship, and in
society beyond academia. Judges and other legal decisionmakers in
particular are admonished to consider context, and to recognize the
unique life story that each litigant represents. The rule-of-law model,
or "law for law's sake," should not block judges' experiential understanding of the world - their "practical reason" - or be invoked to
deny or devalue the actual human concerns at stake in a given legal
setting. 8
Cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 9 it is argued, should be
seen as a simple truth about the harm in segregation that any ten-year
old black child understands. 10 Lawyers should argue this simple
truth. Judges should respect it. Law should enforce it. That is, legal
cases should be approached as concrete human stories that take into
account our different human voices. These two terms - "story" and
"voice" - are important new words in this area of legal writing. 11
knowledge and rationality. See R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 25-27 (1983).
4. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 19 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 3, at 1577.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53. Many, but not all, of these arguments draw
upon Richard Rorty's work in philosophy. See R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
NATURE (1979).
7. See, e.g., Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and
the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983).
8. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 1587; see also J.B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 133-36, 168-91.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Yudof, supra note 3, at 589-90; see also Getman, Voices, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 577, 584-85
(1988).
11. It likely stems from Carol Gilligan's rather astonishingly popular work, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE (1982). See also J.B. WHITE, supra note 3, at 34, 41-42, 47-48; Getman, supra note 10, at
577, passim; Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447; Minow, The Supreme Court,
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One problem underscored in this scholarship is that individual,
concrete human voices and abstract, general legal rules often conflict.
Written laws are impersonal. Moreover, the rule-of-law model trains
us - that is, legal personnel - to "treat like cases alike," and to define relevant similarities generally. The purposes of the written law
according to this model are thought to go beyond individuals. This
focus, say some legal scholars, can be destructive. It may lead to a
disregard for individuals, and may exalt logical consistency and predictability over compassion and substantive justice. Therefore, the
writers urge, lawyers, judges, and scholars should not suppress emotion and experiential understanding. Empathy, human stories, and
different voices should be woven into the tapestry of legal scholarship,
legal training, law formulation, legal counseling and advocacy, and
law application and enforcement.

B.

''Empathy," ''Rule of Law," and ''Legal Storytelling" Defined

At this point, the terms "empathy," "rule of law," and "legal
storytelling" require closer scrutiny. Defining these terms is not easy,
because many writers use the terms without clarifying their intended
meaning, or define the terms differently from other writers. Moreover,
the words often are used less as precise descriptions than as symbols of
much broader concepts.
1. Empathy
In a recent article, Professor Lynne Henderson notes the prevalent
use of the term "empathy" in legal works, and offers a much needed
clarification of the term. 12 She identifies three aspects of empathy or
empathic capacity:
1. The capacity to perceive others as having one's own goals, interests and affects;
2. imaginative experience of the situation of another; and
3. the distress response that accompanies this experiencing
which may (but not must) lead to action to ease the pain of another. 13

In discussing the relevant psychological literature and the current
speculations about what determines the empathic capacity of a human
being, Henderson notes that the environment of an individual seems to
1986 Term -Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); Sherry, Civic Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986). See generally
Shaughnessy, Gilligan's Travels, 7 J. L. & INEQUALITY 1 (1988); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989).
12. Henderson, supra note 3; see also Henderson, The Dialogue of Heart and Head, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 123 (1988).
13. Henderson, supra note 3, at 1579-82.
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play a major role. That is, our socialization and learning and early
childhood experiences - particularly experiences with separation and
attachment - principally determine our ability to "empathize" in
later life. 14 Thus, for example, someone who has suffered pain is more
likely to personalize the suffering of others and be affected more
strongly by it. 15 Gender per se does not appear to affect empathic
capacity.
External conditions also may influence our empathic capacity, and
may cause us to ignore our empathic distress response. In particular,
some writers argue, legal training can encourage us to block or inhibit
empathic responses because it deems certain factors, including our
emotions, to be "irrelevant." 16 As Henderson puts it, "the ideological
structures of legal discourse and cognition block affective and phenomenological argument." 17 The result, she says, is that a mode of
understanding that is best described as "empathy" is "foreclosed" or
sent "underground." 18 The loss she perceives in this approach to legal
discourse is that our legal decisions and their justification fail to consider the full range of human experience and to appreciate situations
of others.
2. Rule-of-Law

The term rule-of-law model is generally defined as a model that
requires those who exercise government authority to conform strictly
to the rules. "For our purposes, ... its most relevant meaning is conveyed by .. .'a government of laws and not of men.' ... [G]overnment
by rules takes precedence over government by will of those holding
official power." 19 The underlying concept is that "formal rationality,"
14. Id. at 1583; cf Goleman, Researchers Trace Empathy's Roots to Infancy, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 28, 1989, at Cl, col. 1 (reporting on recent research that suggests there may be a neural
basis for empathy).
15. Henderson, supra note 3, at 1583 (citing A. BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OP
THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 316 (1986)).
16. See id. at 1588.
17. Id. at 1575.
18. Id. at 1576.
19. M. KADISH & s. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 41 (1973); see also Michelman,
Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World, in JUSTIFICATION 71, 72-73
(Nomos XXVIII, J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986) ("The notion of decision according to law
implies comparison of the case with some external standard that in some degree constrains or
points to one or another decision, if it does not fully determine the outcome. The external norm
must have some prescriptive force.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 179, 180-81 (1986) (describing the multiple ways in which the terms "legal formalism" and "legal realism" have been used over the years); Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 509,
510 (1988) ("At the heart of the word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept
of decisionmaking according to rule.") (emphasis in original).
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which means consistent application of prior stated rules, should
prevail.
The argument against formal rationality as a method of legal decisionmaking is that it may prevail to the detriment of substantive rationality. A judge can invoke a legal principle - for example, that
black men are property - and ignore the impact of that principle on
people. The judge's feelings and the feelings of black men are irrelevant to the dispute. Substantive justice, which means a fair or good
result, is sacrificed in favor of consistent application of the legal principle. 20 Moreover, the judge can claim that a result is good simply because it upholds prior-stated law.
The popular image of lawyers is that we are committed to formal
rationality. We are trained to cabin "empathic" responses and remain
steadfast in our commitment to legal principles despite emotional dissonance. An anecdote, perhaps apocryphal, 21 about Justice O'Connor
confirms this image. The story goes that, while a state court judge,
Justice O'Connor was compelled by law to impose a strict sentence on
a criminal defendant. After she dispassionately announced her verdict
in open court, she retired to her chambers and wept. That is, Justice
O'Connor maintained her professional discipline and curbed any personal or emotional desire to deviate from the prior-stated, popular
legal standards. This was proper and commendable judicial conduct,
according to conventional wisdom. 22
Increasing numbers of legal scholars decry this assumed tendency
of legal professionals to invoke and apply the rule-of-law, yet shield
themselves from the emotional and moral consequences of their actions. 23 Justice O'Connor's private anguish, according to some people,
What I mean by formalism ... is a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes
about the basic terms of social life, disputes that people call ideological, philosophical, or
visionary.... The formalism I have in mind characteristically invokes impersonal purposes,
policies, and principles as an indispensable component of legal reasoning.
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564 (1983).
20. The law controls the factors that are "relevant," or, to put it another way, that fall within
the lines. And, as Unger has observed, "[e]verything will depend on where one draws the line."
R. UNGER, LAW JN MODERN SOCIETY 204 (1976). Yudof has observed that "[a]ny particular
legal ordering spun from the human imagination may be just or unjust. But the ordering itself
determines what facts are necessary to adjudication and thus the relevance of particular human
voices." Yudof, supra note 3, at 590.
21. I do not recall the source of this anecdote, and cannot vouch for its accuracy. I acknowledge the worrisome possibility, suggested to me by Professor Fred Schauer, that such' stories may
be more likely to be told about women judges than about men.
22. Cf Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U: L. REV. 63, 78
(1980) ("[T]he standard conception [of the lawyer's role] calls for a sharp separation of private
and professional morality .... [which] requires a public endorsement, as well as private adoption, of the extreme strategy of detachment.").
23. Cover made this point in Justice Accus(!d. He wrote:
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should not have been confined to her chambers, but should have figured in her public deliberations and in the legal result. If application
of the penal code made Justice O'Connor weep, then her pain should
have alerted her to the possibility that the code should not, in that
case, have been so applied. Legal decisionmaking should not discount
feelings, whether of the litigants or of other relevant actors in our legal
dramas. Our emotions and affect should be as much a part of normal
legal discourse as the "objective" legal rules.
3. Legal Storytelling
Richard Delgado is correct when he notices that "[e]veryone has
been writing stories these days." 24 Moreover, they are telling stories
to many different audiences, to promote a broad range of different
ends. The participants in this symposium, for example, describe or use
multiple sorts of stories: stories that bridge,25 providing connections
between people of different experience, stories that explode Qike grenades) certain ways of thinking, 26 stories that mask, devalue, or suppress other stories, 27 stories that consolidate, validate, heal, and fortify
(like therapy), 28 and even stories that maim or "spirit murder"29 and
so should not be told at all. 30
The participants likewise describe different sorts of audiences for
their stories. Some are stories told by legal scholars, which are directed at other members of the academic community. 31 Other stories
are told by lawyers to judges or juries. 32 Other writers discuss "stock
The judicial conscience is an artful dodger and rightfully so. Before it will concede that a
case is one that presents a moral dilemma, it will hide in the nooks and crannies of the
professional ethics, run to the cave of role limits, seek the shelter of separation of powers.
R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 201 (1975) {describing judges' reactions to slavery).
24. Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411, 2411 {1989).
25. See, e.g., Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Matsuda, Public Sanction ofRacist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on For·
mal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
26. See, e.g., Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2382 (1989); Delgado, supra note 24.
27. See, e.g.. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280
(1989); Bell, supra note 26; Delgado, supra note 24; Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court
and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152 (1989); Williams, supra note 25.
28. See, e.g., Delgado supra note 24, at 2437.
29. The phrase is Patricia Williams'. See Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The
Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987).
30. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 25 (arguing for criminalizing racist hate speech).
31. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 26; Delgado, supra note 24.
32. See Cunningham, supra note 25; Williams, supra note 25.
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stories"33 told by judges to the community34 and told by the community about itself, 35 and offer competing "counterstories," that are told
by outgroups to themselves, or that can be directed at "ingroups" in
an effort to convert, or even deconstruct the stock story. 36
This storytelling theme ties in to the empathy theme in several
ways. Stories tend to work directly from "experiential understanding," which the empathy writers encourage us to use. Consequently,
narrative may be a particularly powerful means of facilitating empathic understanding: a concrete story comes closest to actual experience and so may evoke our empathic distress response more readily
than abstract theory. Telling stories can move us to care, and hence
pave the way to action. To the extent that lawyers and judges are
engaged in acts of persuasion - which they clearly are - legal scholarship reasonably should be interested both in how narratives, in general, tend to "work" (persuade), and in which ones, in particular,
succeed. 37
There is, however, more to the legal storytelling theme than the
exploration of effective advocacy techniques. Like the writing on empathy, storytelling is part of an overall "call to context," which is directed at jurisprudential and normative ends. Those who encourage
legal storytelling and those who favor empathic decisionmaking seem
to share at least two concerns. One concern is that legal theory and
legal discourse often are too removed from individual experience.
Academics, judges, and lawyers often juggle concepts and spar with
abstractions, without consulting the human concerns actually at issue
in their deliberations. Stories can shock them back into sensation, into
life as it is versus how we talk about it. Stories are one way to bring
law down to life, to the people, "to the ground." This reflects, I believe, a broader suspicion of traditional jurisprudence's emphasis on
acontextual rules and about the way that Western epistemology tends
to describe or interpret experience and understanding.
The second shared concern of at least some of the legal storytelling
advocates is normative. To favor bringing things down to context, to
individual storytellers and their unique experience, is to favor the
"protestant" view of interpretive authority that Professor David
33. This phrase is Gerald L6pez's. See L6pez, The Internal Structure of Lawyering: Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984).
34. See, e.g.. Luban, supra note 27.
35. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 27.
36. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 24; Matsuda, supra note 25.
37. A provocative question, which I think could easily be the subject of an entire separate
symposium, is this: Why is Patricia Williams' "sausage story" so marvelously, unforgettably
"good"? See Williams, supra note 25, at 2130-31.

2106

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:2099

Luban describes. 38 This view implies that all voices are equal, and
that diversity of voice should be a paramount political value. Human
dignity - each storyteller is an end, not a means - seems to be an
implicit normative principle of the legal storytelling approach. 39 A
further normative implication is, I believe, that our ultimate goal
should be "minimalist rules,'' in order to maximize multi-voicedness
and freedom.
Beyond such very general shared concerns and values, however, I
find little consensus among these writers about the implications of the
call to context. For example, some writers suggest that we need rules
that silence some voices, and fortify other storytellers who, historically, have been silenced. This is, of course, inconsistent with a view
that each voice counts, regardless of its message. Some writers invoke
the call to context to further the critique of liberalism. Still others
invoke "voice" to encourage a shift away from individualism to the socalled ethic of care. For these reasons, the "call to context" is complex, often contradictory, and difficult to summarize. This essay is a
preliminary attempt to make some sense of this movement, and to express some doubts and hopes about its future course.
II.

CRITIQUE

A call for more "empathy," more human "stories," and more liberated "voices" has intuitive and immediate appeal. Many people,
myself included, agree that individuals should be noticed, heard, and
respected by the law, and that current legal discourse may undermine
or undervalue these concerns in serious and painful ways. I write not
to reject or discredit this claim, but to suggest that the new terminology may not be helpful; to express several concerns about the limitations of the "call to context"; and to encourage a shift in focus to what
I believe is the deeper malady that triggers the criticism that the law is
"unempathetic" to individual needs. I focus my remarks primarily on
the application of the empathy, or "context," discourse to the work of
judges, rather than to lawyers, legislators, or legal scholars.
A.

The Terminology

As an analytical tool, the term "empathy" is not very helpful. Pro38. Luban, supra note 27.
39. For an excellent discussion and sensitive critique of the legal storytelling movement see
Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 543, 578-81 (1988). See also Bartlett, Storytelling (Book Review), 1987 DUKE. L.J. 760
(noting that storytelling can be used equally for progressive reform and for other, contradictory
purposes).
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fessor Henderson correctly notes that although "[e]mpathy has become a favorite word in critical and feminist scholarship[,] . . . it is
never defined or described - it is seemingly tossed in as a 'nice' word
in opposition to something bad or undesirable."40 Her clarification of
the empathy phenomenon, however, helps explain why the word is of
limited use when applied to concrete legal problems.
First, the term is borrowed from psychological literature. This obviously does not discredit it. as a legal term, but it does suggest that it
may have a different meaning and function when exported to the unfamiliar context of law. Psychological theories about empathy and empathic understanding presuppose a setting in which law rarely
operates: ·one person feeling the distress of another person. If a judge
(one person) were asked only to consider and experience the distress of
one other person, then the concept of empathy might prove a significant tool for describing and improving the judging process. But the
judge in an adversary system such as ours must empathize with, or
"stand in the shoes of," several people, or, more often, business organizations, the government, or other representative groups. The judge
hears conflicting "stories," and must order competing "voices." Of
course, an empathic person will better "hear" all stories - that is,
"both sides" - than one who heeds only one voice. This insight is
well understood, though, and may not require extended consideration.
The context and functions of psychology differ from that of law in
numerous other ways relevant to the empathy phenomenon.41 For example, the psychiatrist (or mental health counselor) has no set time
within which the psychological intervention, such as therapy, must be
completed; a legal decisionmaker does. The psychiatrist is not expected to, or in conventional psychotherapy allowed to, judge a patient, let alone sentence her to death; legal decisionmakers must
judge. 4 2 The psychiatrist has the opportunity for repeated interactions
with the patient over an extended period of time, in private settings,
with no other people present; the judge may only see the parties' lawyers, not the parties themselves, usually in a public courtroom during
brief, episodic encounters. When the parties do appear, the setting is
40. Henderson, supra note 3, at 1578.
41. My colleague Walter Weyrauch has developed a comparison of "legal therapy" and
"psychological therapy," in which he points out differences between them and argues that legal
therapy is, in many ways, more effective. W. Weyrauch, Some Propositions That Speak for Legal
over Psychiatric Counseling (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
42. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (describing the "jurispathic" role of courts and their essentially
coercive nature). Of course, when expert psychological testimony is used by law - such as in
making predictions of future dangerousness or assessing legal insanity - the psychiatrist is contributing to judgments that carry severe sanctions, including capital punishment.
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hardly intimate or otherwise conducive to "knowing" someone.
Either empathy advocates must favor radical restructuring of court
procedures to make them more congenial to "contextual" justice,43 or
they mean something different from this strong sense of "empathy" some weaker phenomenon that can happen in public courtroom settings, through lawyer representatives.
I believe these differing missions of law and psychiatry, and the
functional restrictions of law, make the deeper meaning of "empathy"
useful in psychology, but dramatically less so in law. 44 It is no wonder, then, that when pressed into service in the complicated, dynamic
and unfamiliar real-world territory of legal conflicts, the psychological
term "empathy" becomes little more than a soft, "nice" word.
I also have reservations about Professor Henderson's suggestion
that a refined appreciation of the empathy phenomenon offers a distinctive tool for analyzing legal decisions. Her specific examples of a
breakthrough of empathic understanding - Brown v. Board of Education 45 and of empathic failure - Bowers v. Hardwick 46 are not selfproving. Each decision can be supported or condemned on different
grounds. Brown, which abolished separate-but-equal schools, may be
read simply as a long-overdue realization that separate is not equal: a
straightforward constitutional analysis. Or it may have been an emotional, adverse response to the harsh effects of discrimination on
school-aged black children. Hardwick, which upheld the Georgia sodomy statute, may be read simply as a refusal to include in our catalogue of individual rights the right to engage in certain types of sexual
activity47-also routine constitutional analysis. Or it may have been
an emotional, adverse response to homosexuality. The opinion cites
history and scripture, suggesting still other bases for the result.
43. I am unaware of any such proposal, although the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
movement comes close. The absence of such proposals is striking and significant. As Frank
Michelman has observed: "[T]he reality and even the possibility of legalist justification have
been under sharp and sustained attack in this country for sixty years and more, and yet the
attackers, so far as I know, have not advocated abolition of the courts ..•• " Michelman, supra
note 19, at 83.
44. A lawyer argues for an empathic distress response. Hers is an appeal for particular legal
action and not - in the end - for mere empathic understanding. She is saying, as many of this
symposium's participants are saying, that a given story deserves to be heard and heeded. This
type of advocacy is not, to my knowledge, part of the psychiatrist's traditional professional role.
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Henderson, supra note 3, at 1593-609.
46. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Henderson, supra note 3, at 1638-50.
47. At least one court, however, has interpreted Hardwick not as a judgment favoring heterosexuality over homosexuality, but as a judgment that the right to privacy does not extend to
sexual activity outside of marriage. Thus, a Maryland law proscribing oral sex was held constitutional, as applied to unmarried heterosexuals. See Schochet v. Maryland, 75 Md. App. 314, 541
A.2d 183 (1988); Anti-Sodomy Law May Be Applied to Consenting Unmarried Heterosexuals, 14
Fam. L. Rep. 1380 (1988).
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"Traditional legal thinking" thus was not necessarily the villain in
Hardwick, and "empathic understanding" was not necessarily the
hero in .Brown.
Explaining these results or analyzing what "really" determines the
rulings of the United States Supreme Court or of lower court judges is
a confounding and complicated endeavor, as the depth and variety of
legal scholarship on this topic proves. I submit that the task of
describing and defending choices about what should happen in these
cases is both a more important and more difficult task. Moreover, I
believe that the term "empathy" does not help us measurably in these
endeavors. To say, for example, that "[t]he goal of the law ... should
be to encourage ... empathic intersubjectivity"48 - an "empathic and
loving community"49 does not begin to answer whether affirmative action laws or sodomy laws deserve support, unless "empathy" means
far more than the psychological definition implies. The "empathy"
concept does not offer reasons why human distress is something we
should alleviate, or criteria for choosing whose distress should trigger
our response. The residual meaning, and potential usefulness of the
term for law, therefore seem to be indistinguishable from that of many
other terms, such as compassion, tolerance, justice, equity, or simple
human kindness.
Judicial decisions surely are explainable, at least in part, by a
judge's ability to understand, "hear," or empathize with certain litigants. 50 But we already know that. Moreover, Professor Henderson's
reading of the psychological literature suggests that our empathic capacity is determined, to a large extent, by our upbringing. This means
that judges, as human beings, cannot empathize with all litigants.
"Law" likewise cannot "empathize" with everyone equally. All
stories cannot be given equal value. To do so would deny the ordering
of interests inherent to law. For example, Professor Matsuda asks that
we give greater value to the victim's story than to that of the first
amendment absolutist, or to that of the promoter of racial hatred. 51
To criminalize the telling of any story is to silence that voice. She
48. West, supra note 3, at 863.
49. Id. at 860-61.
50. This would seem to be especially true at the trial court level, where the judge has personal contact with the parties. At the appellate level, the judge's only personal contact is with
the parties' lawyers. In some cases, even this contact will not occur if the case is decided without
oral arguments. Moreover, appellate judges have limited fact-finding powers. Ted Schneyer has
observed, in his reaction to an earlier version of this essay, that the empathy writers' emphasis on
the role of experiential understanding may therefore turn legal academics' attention more toward
the trial, rather than the appeal, as the paradigm legal event; and to the jury, rather than the
judge, as the paradigm legal decisionmaker.
51. See Matsuda, supra note 25.
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wants the law to assure that this person will not incline our hearts, or
persuade members of our community to heed this story. The "proper"
ordering of voices thus seems to be the underlying fundamental issue.
The significant modern questions thus are not whether judges and
"law" should "empathize," or whether stories are exceptional windows to experience, but with whom should we empathize - why,
when, and according to what procedures? Which stories should law
privilege? Which stories are profane? These are, of course, very familiar questions about law, which are no less intractable when addressed
with new terminology.
B.

The Rule-of-Law Model as Villain

Most writers who argue for more empathy in the law concede that
law must resort to some conventions and abstract principles. That is,
they do not claim that legal rules are, as rules, intrinsically sinister.
Rather, they argue that we should design our legal categories and procedures in a way that encourages the decisionmakers to consider individual persons and concrete situations. Generalities, abstractions, and
formalities should not dominate the process. The law should be flexible enough to take emotion into account, and to respond openly to the
various "stories" of the people it controls. We should, as I have said,
move toward "minimalist" law.
Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules
are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law
model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive
justice. 52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal
52. See generally J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 165-66 (1963); H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-50 (1961); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 25 (1977); R. UNGER, supra note 20, at 52-57, 192-223; Barnett, Foreword: Can Justice and
the Rule of Law Be Reconciled?, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 597 (1988); Kennedy, Legal
Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 377-91 (1973); Schauer, supra note 19, at 509; Thompson, The
Role of the Rule ofLaw in the Liberal State, 1 NATAL U. L. & Socv. REV. 126 (1986); Tushnet,
Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH L. REV. 1502 (1985). A complicated
strand of the attack on the "Rule of Law" appears in feminist jurisprudence and in particular in
the writings of Professor Robin West. She claims that "the Rule of Law does not value intimacy
- its official value is autonomy," West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58
(1988), and that it does not recognize "the contradiction which characterizes women's, but not
men's lives: while we value the intimacy we find so natural, we are endangered by the invasion
and dread the intrusion in our lives which intimacy entails, and we long for individuation and
independence." Id. at 59. In making her claim, as I understand it, Professor West is using the
term "Rule of Law" far more broadly than I am - to mean the prevailing jurisprudence in
American (patriarchal) society. Her criticism of that model therefore proceeds from a different
point and is directed at a deeper, systemic problem in our legal system. I do not think that she
would argue that, in a post-patriarchal world, procedural regularity would be abandoned or
formal rationality would disappear as one part of a just legal system.
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decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by
reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have
suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In
this regard, I have several observations.
My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If
the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics,"
then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular
(unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended.
"Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship,"
"negligence," or "freedom of speech" - to name only a few legal concepts - hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable
application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining
sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish
spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.
Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the
indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different
"stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories,
and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort
of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking
popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate
law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain
guiding principles. 55
As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and
fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations.
The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in
decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's
own experiences -including the experiences that seem to determine a
person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal
results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at
times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legi53. See, e.g., Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). For a description
of the Critical Legal Studies critique of legalism, and a cogent, thoughtful response, see
Michelman, supra note 19.
54. See Michelman, supra note 19, at 86.
55. The law school emphasis on the indeterminacy of rules may be exaggerated, in part because of professors' tendency to focus on difficult appellate. cases. See Schauer, Judging in a
Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1988).
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timization of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the
facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking
therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite
our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.
Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not
necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and
empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended
standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's
prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the
defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action
to make the law more specific - more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically
defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman,
except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a
persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain
these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a
triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule,
some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example
thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least
some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the
principle oflegality is potentially most critical for people who are least
understood by the decisionmakers - in this example, women - and
hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.
A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply
ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity - "law for law's sake" - because it lends stasis
and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other
56. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 52, at 130; Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Sub·
stantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); Weyrauch, Law as Mask - Legal Ritual
and Relevance, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 710-11 (1978).
This argument against legality is different from one that claims that rules chill empathy.
Here the concern is that rules may be illusions or masks. We claim judges follow rules, but they
in fact follow extra-legal instincts that are wrapped in rules' clothing. That is, stated rules do not
constrain (or chill) after all.
57. See generally, Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977); Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Galvin, Shielding Rape
Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV.
763 (1986); Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome
Issue and Its Implications/or Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985).
58. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 412.
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party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or
"substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations.
The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. 60
These points together suggest that "legality," as we actually experience it in American culture, is not the natural enemy of empathy.
When pared to its roots, the "empathy" theme therefore seems not to
be a call for more empathy, but for a different ordering of our empathic responses. It represents a hope that certain specific, different
and previously disenfranchised voices - such a~ those of blacks and
women and poor people and homosexuals - will be heard, and will
prevail This is not a call to conversation; it is convert-sation. For
example, Professor Henderson's condemnation of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick may be read as a call for more empathy for homosexuals and less empathy for people who are fearful of,
incensed about, or otherwise disturbed by homosexuality. This appeal
is not necessarily an indictment of legality, or even of any particular
legal principle - whether it is "equal protection" or "right to privacy." Nor is it an endorsement of storytelling as an intrinsically good
act: a homophobic story is told by a human being too. Rather, the
empathy discourse implies a political and ethical agenda, which involves making choices among competing values or sets of feeling. Adherence to "law for law's sake" therefore poses a problem only if one
deems that particular law or its application to be foolish, cruel, narrow, or shortsighted. 61
59. See, e.g., Weyrauch, The Family as Small Group, in GROUP DYNAMIC LAW: EXPOSITION AND PRACTICE, 153 (D. Funk ed. 1988).
Kundera captures this sense when he describes the law of personal relationships as follows:
[E]very love relationship is based on unwritten conventions rashly agreed upon by the
lovers during the first weeks of their love. On the one hand, they are living a sort of dream;
on the other, without realizing it, they are drawing up the fine print of their contracts like
the most hard-nosed of lawyers. 0 Lovers! Be wary during those perilous first days! If you
serve the other party breakfast in bed, you will be obliged to continue same in perpetuity or
face charges of animosity and treason!
M. KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING 36 (1981).
60. The inconsistent application of "rules" can be psychologically destructive. The famous
studies by Seligman on the effects on animals of noncontingent negative reinforcement demonstrate this in a dramatic fashion. See M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEATH (1975).
61. As Galligan has written:
The simple point is that once the substantive requirements of a theory of justice have been
applied, there is no remainder to which the idea of formal justice refers. It is the substantive
principles of the particular theory that regulate the distribution of benefits and burdens, and
so determine how individuals are to be treated.... The precept to treat like cases alike is
satisfied by the rational application of a substantive theory of justice.
D. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS 160 (1986). That is, the rule-of-law model - which
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I agree with the instincts - that is, with the outcomes - that
these empathy writers seem to favor. I nevertheless believe that we
cannot intelligently further a particular political agenda, such as permitting homosexuals to engage in private, consensual intercourse,
without invoking such acontextual principles as individual autonomy,
the value of sexuality, and appropriate limits on state power to intervene in private affairs. 62 Concrete stories that illustrate why a contrary rule is mean-spirited and deeply alienating for some human
beings would (and should) support that claim, but "hurtfulness" alone
will not persuade many people to change the rules. Rather, this hurtful character must be evaluated in the context of some philosophy of
social justice, some (abstract) theory of law. As Professor Sylvia Law
recently said:
The unnecessary human suffering caused by laws that punish sexual intimacy should be a critical component of constitutional analysis.
Yet, to evaluate individual interests in sexual expression solely in
terms of avoidance of harm is inappropriately narrow.... [T]he core
human importance of sexuality suggests that our constitutional visions of
liberty and equality should encompass a more affirmative perspective on
sexuality than simply the avoidance of state-inflicted danger and pain. 63

That is, it is not only "hurtful" to discriminate against blacks and
homosexuals and women - it also is wrong as a matter of principled
ordering of relevant interests in American constitutional law. Not all
hurtful rules, however, will be "wrong" rules. 64 For example, a rule
that requires testing for AIDS may not be "wrong," though it may
includes the notions that laws should be "prospective, open and clear,'' see Thompson, supra note
itself is benign if the underlying
substantive law is benign.
62. In fact, one cannot talk about the issue without moving beyond context. What, for example, do we mean when we say "homosexual"? We are not, I assume, talking only about Mr.
Hardwick's experiences. Nor are we talking about all of his life experiences. We are limiting our
"context," to certain aspects of his life - ones we deem "relevant" to the legal question. For an
in-depth exploration of this problem of rules and "context," see F. Schauer, Three Comments on
Context (unpublished paper presented at Harvard Law School, Apr. 1988) (on file with author).
63. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender. 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 227-28
(footnote omitted).
64. Professor Joan Shaughnessy examines this problem of pain - how law hurts - in the
following passage:
In the course of their work, lawyers and judges are frequently required to inflict great
pain ....
. . • It is difficult to inflict pain, and the more intimately we know another person, the
more difficult it becomes. To know all may well be to forgive all, and that the law cannot
afford ....
. . . In short, the professional roles we assume as lawyers and judges have built into them
a protective distancing mechanism, a mechanism explained by the need for lawyers and
judges to inflict pain in the course of carrying out the law's coercive power in our society.
Shaughnessy, supra note 11, at 23-24. Indeed, much of her elegant essay tracks the concerns I
express here. Cj Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (observing that
"[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death").
52, at 126, and that similar cases should be treated similarly -
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well be "hurtful" to those affected. We therefore need to explain and
justify "right" and "wrong" in terms of our political and constitutional doctrines, and underlying values.
A final, and important, observation is that our legal procedures do
not block the lawyer's opportunity to tell a client's story. Modem trial
procedures do not prevent the lawyer who represents the victim of
state-inflicted danger and pain from bringing this anguish to the
factfinder's attention. Client stories thus can be, and often are,· both
told and heard, even when reported judicial opinions fail to mention
these details of trial-level dramas. 65 Human suffering is not "irrelevant" as a matter of American law or procedure. Yet it is clear that
some peoples' suffering is consistently discounted or denied by the
humans who draft and enforce qur laws. Also clear is that legal rules
and their enforcement restrict the range of discourse, 66 and do so in
ways that tend to reflect (and sometimes, to magnify) the prejudices,
empathic blindness, and insensitivities of the dominant communities.
The voices of the dominant communities typically receive the validation of rules, so that other voices lack this "reification" and validation.
But the problem often originates in the community - in us - not in
the written rule. Law is not merely a cause; it is also an effect. "Legalism" alone does not cause slavery, discrimination, or gross disparities in wealth and social goods. To claim that it does is to lay the
blame for cruelty outside the human hearts and minds that invent it.
Laws surely reinforce and thus can entrench the status quo, but are, at
root, human inventions. To return to one of Henderson's examples,
the "empathy-blocker" in Hardwick likely was deep-seated antipathy
toward homosexuals in the dominant heterosexual community, 67 and
not the rule-of-law model, the Constitution, legal training, or judicial
personality. That is, some human voices were heard in Hardwick, but
not the "right" ones.
65. Although his voice did not prevail, the voice of infant Joshua DeShaney was heard all the
way up to the United States Supreme Court. Joshua was beaten by his father so severely that he
became brain-damaged. A lawsuit was filed against the county department of social services,
alleging that its failure to intervene on Joshua's behalf was a violation of due process. DeShaney
v. Winnebago City Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). Most striking was Justice Blackmun's heartfelt dissent in which he writes: "Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an
irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who
... did essentially nothing." 109 S. Ct. at 1012-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Poor Joshua,"
indeed. These two simple words are among the most eloquent in recent Supreme Court history.
66. As Duncan Kennedy has said, "For any given factual conflict of rights, the doctrinal
structure will offer a choice of categorizations; the techniques of reasoning that are supposed to
tell us which choice to make will themselves reproduce that choice at another level." Kennedy,
The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 360 (1979).
67. See, e.g., Law, supra note 63, at 227-28 (arguing that the basis for negative attitudes
toward homosexuals is the desire to preserve traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity
and to uphold the political, market apd family structures premised on gender differentiation).
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In summary, the rule-of-law model and empathy are not natural,
inevitable antagonists. American statutory and decisional laws rarely
are so specific that they require wooden, "unempathetic" results.
Modern American trial procedures do allow trial lawyers to personalize their clients and tell their stories. 68 The dilemma lies in the realizations that all stories cannot dominate, and that law often privileges the
stories of the powerful and drowns out the voices of the weak and
marginal. We cannot escape this problem of power, or the fact that
legal decisions must be based on some set of political and moral values. The concept of empathy does not, I regret, assist us in making
these hard choices. It does not help solve the underlying issues of social policy and social justice. 69 It offers, perhaps because of its roots in
psychology, a new diagnosis for a known condition, rather than the
much needed prognosis or recommended course of treatment.
C.

The Call for Individualized Justice and the Link to Discretion

The argument for more empathy often includes a call for more
"individualized" justice. The claim is that judges should focus more
on context - the result in this case to these parties - and less on
formal rationality - squaring this result with results in other cases.
This means that law must be more open-ended or general, and that
legal decisionmakers must be given greater flexibility to reach "right"
decisions. 70 No two applicants for welfare, no two alleged rapists, no
two tort-feasors or tort victims will have the same story. Accordingly,
if we want judges to hear these varying stories, and to craft decisions
that meet individual, contextual needs, then legislators must give wide
- even limitless - discretion to judges and other legal decisionmakers. The inevitable link between discretion and empathy71
68. Cf Cunningham, supra note 25.
69. The problem, of course, is not new. The proposed solution - rejection of legal formal·
ism - is not new either. Galligan describes the course of the movement away from formalism
and the obstacles it encountered as follows:
It was a common theme of the realist and sociological schools of jurisprudence that a wider
view of the legal domain ought to be taken by casting aside formal, rule-based constraints, so
that issues of social policy and social justice could be confronted by legal institutions and,
with assistance from the social sciences, be resolved. The delegation of tasks to specialized
administrative authorities appeared to answer that call exactly; but it soon became clear that
the precepts of social justice may be more difficult to determine, communities more divided
in their interests and values and the contribution of the social sciences more limited.
D. GALLIGAN, supra note 61, at 70-71 (footnote omitted).
70. The more one focuses on substantive rationality (specific outcomes) of the law, rather
than formal rationality (consistent or even-handed application of rules within a system of laws),
the greater the discretion in that legal order. See id. at 70.
71. Discretion, in turn, is linked to judicial lawmaking versus judicial law enforcement. The
question therefore becomes the procedural one of who should decide issues of social policy and
social justice. The principle of legality suggests a set procedure for these determinations. As
Selznick phrased it: "Legality has to do mainly with how policies and rules are made and applied
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thus deserves attention in any discussion of empathy and law.
A proposal implying that greater discretionary authority should be
given to legal decisionmakers betrays tremendous faith in the wisdom
and responsiveness of our decisionmakers. 72 One reason to be skeptical about this faith is that "empathic capacity," as well as other relevant decisionmaking qualities, are unevenly distributed among human
beings. Official discretion is dangerous. A second reason to resist giving greater discretion to judges is that American law already affords
pervasive discretionary authority to judges, administrators, and other
officials responsible for law enforcement and application. Moreover,
much of this discretion is standardless and virtually nonreviewable.
The practical and theoretical dangers of discretion are well known
and much discussed. As Professor Francis Allen has observed, giving
discretion to decisionmakers competes with our desire for "a viable
system of comprehensible authoritative norms that contain and direct
the exercise of power by judicial, executive, and administrative officials."73 Perhaps especially in the area of criminal law, convention
holds that legal order depends upon having a prior, clear statement of
the legal standard so that potential offenders know when they may be
violating law and what punishment may follow. 74
American law,
however, this principle is modified by the practices.of jury nullification
and prosecutorial discretion, which permit broad opportunities for individualized reaction to perpetrators. The result has been empathy for
some defendants, but not for others. An escape from legal formality
thus can lead, and has led to impressionistic, idiosyncratic, or stand-

In

rather than with their content. The vast majority of rules, including judge-made rules, spell out
policy choices, choices not uniquely determined by the requirements of legality." P. SELZNICK,
LAW, SOCIETY, AND lNDUSfRIAL JusrICE 11 (1969).
72. I recognize that to embrace even a weak version of the rule-of-law model likewise betrays
faith in judges. It reflects faith that judges can, and do, by and large follow "law." This means
both that I believe legal texts have more or less persuasive, or accurate, interpretations and that
judges should and often do feel constrained by the more persuasive ones.
73. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American Criminal Justice: Some Latter-Day Adventures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 385, 387 (1987). Galligan makes a similar
point. He writes that "discretionary powers are sometimes considered to undermine an important conception of legal authority: the lack of commitment to general decision rules, the consequential merging of political and legal processes, and the diminution in importance of
adjudication." D. GALLIGAN, supra note 61, at 64.
74. The undesirability of "wide-open" decisionmaking might be underscored by an example.
Would law students (or faculty) favor the following disciplinary rule?
Any faculty member may institute dismissal proceedings against any student for cause.
"Cause" shall be determined by one faculty judge, according to her discretion. This judge
shall be appointed by the Dean, but may not be the faculty member who instituted the
proceeding.
Or would faculty favor an equally open-ended standard for decanal decisions regarding salaries,
research leaves, and teaching loads?
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ardless justice, which may not treat all stories equally. 75
American society is pluralistic. We do not share one religion, one
dogma, one concept of justice. At first glance, our heterogeneity
makes "flexible justice" seem attractive. In order to satisfy the multiple, varying interests there must be elasticity, i.e., discretion, built into
the system. A closer look, however, indicates that a large number of
genuinely conflicting interests and views make official discretion more
troublesome, not less. If our voices truly are different, then decisionmaker flexibility may lead more often to the suppression, rather
than the release of some of these different voices. "Formalistic" justice, in the abstract, represents an attempt to avoid the exaggerated
influence of one particular decisionmaker's personality - or empathic
capacity - by compelling her to follow stated and necessarily abstract
legal standards. It also represents our preference for popular, i.e.,
majoritarian, constraint on governmental action. That is, we may
want someone other than the individual judge to make the rules. 76
Absent some requirement, i.e., legal rule, to listen, or a predefined way
of ordering these voices, a judge or other law official likely will not
hear those people who are culturally, morally, ethnically, or otherwise
alien to that judge or official. The vague hope that this will not occur
without dramatic, perhaps infeasible, restructuring of the American
judiciary (if not of human nature) is overly optimistic. 77
Moreover, as I have indicated, opportunities for individualized justice and "discretion" - explicit and implicit - already are dramatically pervasive in American law. 78 The nature of the modem state,
and the role of law today within that state, indicate that this current
call for greater flexibility or "contextualized justice" is an old argu75. This point has been emphasized in the empirical and critical responses to the ADR
movement. See, e.g., Conley & O'Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467 (1988); Delgado, Dunn, Brown,
Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality, Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Displlte
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; O'Barr & Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Socv. REV. 661 (1985). See generally l & 2
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982).
76. Cf. Schauer, supra note 62, at 23.
77. As Professor Allen has cautioned, "Realism teaches us not to expect too much of the
ethics of state action in any arena." F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
62 (1981); cf. W. BENNETT & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM
169-83 (1981) (describing the problem of bias in legal decisionmaking as rooted, in part, in the
difference in storytelling practices among various groups in society). For a provocative look at
four radically different communities within American society, see F. FITZGERALD, CITIES ON A
HILL (1981).
78. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 65-67 (1976);
Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for
"Fixed" and "Preemptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550 (1978); Vorenburg, Decellt Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981).
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ment wrapped in new words. As the modem state. expanded its authority into broader arenas and attempted to legislate on such complex
topics as social welfare, environmental protection, and rehabilitation
of criminals, the goal of "formal rationality" gave way to the desire to
promote "substantive ends." 79 This movement toward more discretionary, contextualized justice has encountered significant obstacles
and criticism, as the shortcomings and failures of "flexible justice" become apparent. For example, greater discretion in the hands of prison
officials or officers dealing with juveniles often has not resulted in more
empathic justice. 80
Of course, no one denies that discretion is an indispensable feature
of just law. I again quote Professor Allen, who has observed that
to deny discretion to those who wield power is to deny to society attainment of those ends that can only be achieved through discretionary exercises of power. Since those ends include many of the most important
policy goals, goals relating to national defense and to human welfare, the
objective of a discretion-free policy is doomed before it begins. This being true, the aspiration of legality confronts the perpetually difficult task
of guaranteeing officials the freedom of action to deal with situations that
cannot be anticipated in all respects in advance, insuring that when action is taken, it will conform tolerably well to the general norms of morality and action expressed and validated in advance by the established
governmental processes. 8 1

We therefore confront an inescapable dilemma. If we limit discre79. See D. GALLIGAN, supra note 61, at 72 (noting that "[i]t has become commonplace that a
notable characteristic of the modern legal system is the prevalence of discretionary powers vested
in a wide variety of officials and authorities"); see also R. HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1987); R. UNGER, supra note 20, at 193-200 (describing the decline of the rule oflaw in the welfare state). See generally THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE,
supra note 75.
80. See, e.g., M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 19, at 43 ("[T]he contemporary problem
is not the existence of discretionary government but how, again in Professor Davis's words, 'to
confine, to structure, and to check' its appropriate exercise.") (quoting K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 4 (1969)); Scull, Progressive Dreams, Progressive Nightmares: Social Control in 20th
Century America (Book Review), 33 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1981) (reviewing D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE AsYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE
AMERICA (1980)) (describing the often empty promises of the Progressive movement toward
individualized criminal justice and juvenile reform); see also Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar:
Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301
(1987) (describing the danger of informality in legal procedures); Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals From Reconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 423 (1987)
(describing the problem of fair outcomes as not hinging on informal versus formal procedures,
but on learning to use effectively the signs of the prevailing system of rhetoric in order to obtain
just outcomes).
A recent news item underscores the potential complexities of "individualizing" justice. A
Chinese man was given five years' probation in the beating death of his wife because of "cultural"
differences - that "explained" his conduct. See Sherman, "Cultural" Defenses Draw Fire, Natl.
L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, p. 3 col. 1. It is perhaps ironic that the feminist community in particular was
outraged by the use of this "cultural" defense.
81. Allen, supra note 73, at 412 (footnote omitted).
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tion in an effort to achieve equality of treatment, then we may limit the
possibilities of justice in individual cases. Strict rules, strictly followed, can become the instrument of the "status quo," 82 and may perpetuate injustice. But so can open - ended rules, construed by people
interested either in preserving the status quo or in promoting other
unjust ends. And, as I have said, some status quo rules may be worth
preserving, whereas others may be ripe for reform. Discretion may
license a decisionmaker to ignore the rules we think are worthy of
support, in favor of her private agenda or personal experiential understanding. To choose between "good rules" and "bad rules," or to decide when to depart from a basically good rule in a particular case,
therefore requires more justification than empathy for the parties.

III.

BEYOND CRITIQUE

This is familiar territory. We are presented with the ancient and
perpetual task of balancing two important yet conflicting desires, both
of which are essential to our sense of ''justice" or "fairness." We have
always desired rule predictability/clarity/consistency yet also valued
rule flexibility/responsiveness. The former division between "law"
and "equity" was a physical, institutional manifestation of these two
desires. 83 It may have reflected our innate sense that for every rule the expression of the privileged status of one interest over another there is always an argument that this interest should not always trump
other interests. So we set rules to guide us and establish the outlines of
"relevance" and of our priorities, but we do this knowing that in practice, i.e., concrete settings, we sometimes need to compromise or juggle
those arrangements within the general parameters of the rules or even,
at times, outside them. The tension between our competing, even contradictory, desires for clarity and fluidity never will disappear. 84
The empathy writers surely know this. They are well aware of the
pedigree of this underlying jurisprudential debate. They are familiar
with the dangers of discretion. They have argued before, talked to, or
studied enough judges, administrators, and other legal decisionmakers
to appreciate that Hercules and Solomon are aspirational figures, not
82. See id.
83. See P. SELZNICK, supra note 71, at 13 ("Rigid adherence to precedent and mechanical
application of rules hamper the capacity of the legal system to take account of new interests and
circumstances, or to adapt to social inequality."). More radical critics of the rule-of-law model
maintain that it offers ideological support for social and economic inequalities of the liberal capitalist systems that emphasize it. Indeed, some writers argue that the sole purpose of the law is its
ideological function, and that if capitalism disappeared, the rule-of-law would too. For a discussion of these theories, see D. GALLIGAN, supra note 61, at 91.
84. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 78; M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 19.
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judicial Everymen. They know, too, that Holmes already described
many years ago the role of experience in the law, 85 and that American
law students - probably all of them - are taught his insight.
If all of this is understood both by empathy writers and their audience, then something else must be afoot. This talk about empathy
must be directed toward ends I have not discerned, and spring from
frustrations with the existing order that I have not identified. 86 I
doubt that the underlying purpose is simply to rephrase in modem
terms the old dialogue between formal and substantive justice.
One likely purpose is to develop further the vocabulary of communitarianism. The point of reference for communitarians is "the shared
lives of people," 87 not the "'unencumbered' individual." 88 The psychological phenomenon of empathy demonstrates that people can, and
do, understand and react to each others' experiences. This is an important observation for a political theory that stresses the intersubjectivity of meaning, the significance of our communal identity to our
personal identity and the interrelationship of people, rather than their
autonomy, detachment, and antagonism. 8 9
The empathy phenomenon, though, both supports and undermines
the "shared lives" view of personal identity. As I already have indicated, the psychological literature shows that our empathy capacity is
limited by our life experiences; we are rimmed and, in some respects,
stunted people. This means that we can share in only some lives, and
relate to only some voices. We are part of some communities, but not
others. I may be bigger than my single physical self, but I am not the
85. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW l (1881). Indeed, the recent movement toward
pragmatism as the philosophical key to understanding and evaluating legal principles may signal
Justice Holmes' emergence as the paradigm modern judge, rather than Dworkin's Hercules. See,
e.g., Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1377-78 (1988);
Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 541 (1988).
86. Or, perhaps I grasp the ends but remain unpersuaded by the method.
87. Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, l l HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY. 625, 630 (1988).
88. Id.
89. The observation is also important to feminist scholarship that builds on the Carol Gilligan "different voice" theory of moral development. Minow describes this work as follows:
Male psychology, feminist theorists argue, is the source in a male-dominated society of conceptions of rational thought that favor abstraction over particularity and mind over body.
Similarly, the assumption of autonomous individualism behind American law, economic
and political theory, and bureaucratic practices rests on a picture of public and independent
man rather than private - and often dependent, or interconnected - woman.
Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 47, 48 (1988). A focus
on human connection, rather than separation, necessarily will emphasize aspects of psychological, biological, philosophical, and other literature that illuminate the favorable possibilities of
knowing others. See West, supra note 3, at 859-64 (describing the feminist response to legal
liberalism and its emphasis on separation).
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world. Rather, my "self" may resemble the concentric circles that
appear when a stone is tossed into a lake. The most distinct and powerful circles are clustered tightly at the source (my physical self). Ripples extend beyond that source, but these circles grow more attenuated
as they extend from the source and, eventually, they disappear. This
vanishing point - the limit of self and the exhaustion of connection is often the beginning point for law. 90
The sense that our law is "unempathetic" thus may stem from the
fact that our public rulemaking often begins where our shared values
and community consensus end. Only when we begin to disagree do we
need legal decisionmakers to order or reconcile our conflicting views.
If this is the underlying problem, then our law always will seem
unempathetic, and can hardly be criticized on this basis. Where consensus ends, lines are drawn; and those outside the line - legal losers
- always will feel unheard and wounded.
Of course, empathic failure occurs not only because all rules even in a more perfect world - involve the exclusion or muting of
some voices, but also because the rules of our imperfect world consistently privilege some perspectives over others. That is, we tend to start
with the same "stones" as the source of most of our legal "circles." 91
And this, I believe, is the root of many - but not all - writers' call to
empathy. It is a desire to be heard - to join in the circle. Again,
however, this is the age-old problem of power - which is neither
90. See Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125, 134 (1973) (observing that
"the greater the relational distance between the parties to a dispute, the more likely is law to be
used to settle the dispute."); cf Cover, supra note 64, at 1629 (noting the limits on comparing
legal interpretation to literature interpretation, insofar as legal interpretation destroys meaning:
"[A]s long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as long as
people are committed to using or resisting the social organizations of violence in making their
interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning that can be
achieved.").
Of course, my assumption that the self knows limits may be wrong. Perhaps those who stress
intersubjectivity and empathic understanding in law are reacting to developments in scientific
theory which suggest that "[t]he material world ... no longer appear[s] as a machine, made up of
a multitude of separate objects, but rather as an indivisible whole; a network of relationships that
includ[es] the human observer in an essential way." F. CAPRA, UNCOMMON WISDOM: CON·
VERSATIONS WITH REMARKABLE PEOPLE 18 (1988).
91. For example, feminist scholarship uncovers and critiques the male reference point that
often underlies many legal principles. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and
the State: Toward a Theory of Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983); Minow, supra note
11; Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique ofRights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 387 (1984);
West, supra note 3.
An ironic twist has developed in the feminist scholarship, however, which is pertinent to the
empathic failure problem. In the political and jurisprudential effort to encourage a broader,
more representative perspective that includes women's voices, some feminist writing tends to
define all women as a single category, and the differences among us are, at times, de-emphasized.
That is, abstract and general categories, which devalue our individual characteristics, appear
even within movements aimed at escaping categories. See Minow, supra note 11, at 47-50.
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made clearer nor less thorny by the empathy theme. Indeed, to best
further the specific ends that many empathy writers admire, such as to
reduce discrimination in our society, we would do well to focus on the
limits of connection rather than our shared lives. If we are mindful of
the failures of community, and of the hard lines of our personal empathic limitations, we may develop more realistic legal proposals that
better account for peoples' predisposition not to see beyond their own
concerns. We also must consider the practical, day-to-day restraints
on even well-intentioned efforts to understand others. 92 The very fact
of pervasive human suffering in our culture offers a sobering caution
against unchecked optimism about human kindness. Acts of generosity and charity do happen, but I fear they are not the public or private
norm. 93
Despite these limitations on our individual and collective empathic
capacity, however, there is an important "more or less" quality at
stake here. The jurisprudential message of the call for empathy is an
appeal for legislative and judicial procedures that permit decisionmakers to reexamine regularly the lines that law draws. 94
Although we "know" at some level that we tend to treat people like
ourselves better than those outside our spheres of familiarity, we often
ignore this knowledge. If verbal reminders of this tendency are built
directly into our legal discourse, they may stimulate legal decisionmakers to reach beyond those tendencies more consistently. 95
92. I wonder, for example, whether academics who favor empathic law have applied these
ideas to their law school communities. If so, what changes were effected? In particular, what
rules, if any, were abandoned and/or adopted?
93. This sentiment is echoed in this recent statement by Schall, relying on Aquinas: "[T]he
world is not conceived ultimately injustice, even though there is a place for justice in the world."
Schall, Human Rights As an Ideological Project, 32 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 47, 59 (1987).
94. This is a vague, essentially hortative, proposal. But it may be necessarily so, given the
broad and rather unfocused claims of the call for greater "empathy,'' or "passion,'' or "humanity" in law. For a similar view, with equally loose criteria for improved judging, see Minow &
Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 50-51 (1988). Cf R. BERNSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 162-63 (arguing that to conceive of the political realm as based on "the principle of
dialogue or conversation" is a "powerful regulative ideal that can orient our practical and political lives"); Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984)
(discussing judges' roles as encouraging communal reconciliation among conflicting groups in
American society through commands that people listen to one another and attempt to notice
their shared interests); Carter, Bows and Arrows, Bows and Cellos (Book Review), 20 GA. L.
REV. 793, 798-803 (1986) (reviewing J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 3, and concluding it simply means we should all continue to talk with open minds).
95. I think, for example, of how jarring it is to see the word "love" in legal scholarship.
Roberto Unger and Robin West's writings come to mind. Perhaps my discomfort is analogous to
that of some business people when words like "child care," "nursery," or "breastfeed" filter into
the boardroom.
Good reason exists, however, to be skeptical of the power of new words to change behaviors
that reflect underlying power arrangements. Again, the irony is revealed through feminist works.
Mary Daly has done ground-breaking work on the patriarchal conversion of some words, once
positive and affirming, into negative and pejorative labels. She traces words like "spinster,"
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They also may foster a healthy, perpetual skepticism about prevailing
categories and legal paradigms. Questions may be raised more often
about which voices are tuned out, and which voices are given leading
roles. Legal outcomes that wound may be harder to tolerate, and thus
more susceptible to reform, if we routinely ask how we would feel if
we were to suffer that same pain - whether it is the pain of job discrimination, segregation, termination of welfare benefits or some other
form of loss or unfairness that the law seeks to redress. The new
words may rekindle our interest in addressing the age-old problem of
injustice. Moreover, we may better escape the truly dismal fate of apprehending that our present legal order is merely a convention, not
divinely or rationally ordained, yet thinking it cannot ever be improved or changed. Whether "empathy" is the right word, or the best
word, or the only word, to further this reformist agenda may not matter. The spirit behind its invocation seems benign.
If this is the "point," however, I believe we need not develop further the concept of empathy. 96 Rather, we need to consider concrete
proposals for legislative, doctrinal, structural, and procedural reform
that will encourage greater responsiveness to multiple voices and communities. 97 We should turn to the next, very difficult questions. How,
for example, should we measure our progress toward a goal of empathic law? What do communitarian rules look like? Who should the
lawmakers be in an empathic legal system? 98 How do we realize, in a
"hag," and "crone" to their roots, and finds they once had favorable meanings. Over time,
however, the words became disabling epithets reserved for certain women. See M. DALY & J,
CAPUTI, WEBSTERS' Frnsr NEW INTERGALACTIC WICKEDARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1987). One caution to be derived from her work is that new words may not change the underlying arrangements or biases; rather, these new words may be co-opted, transmuted, and redefined
to reflect the results that best suit the dominant word-wielders' needs.
96. My feeling at this point brings to mind a Gerald Graff essay, which appeared in the
Texas Law Review symposium on Law as Literature. Graff was commenting on Sanford Levinson's article, in which Levinson argues that interpretations are made by us, not found. Graff
responds:
What these theorists insist on over and over again is the Nietzschean idea that interpretations are made by us and not found, that it is we who have created the standards and norms
of interpretive truth that we so confidently attribute to the nature of things, and that we
must recognize our personal and political responsibility for this creation. But taken merely
thus far, such an assertion is merely a platitude, to which the proper reply is not "No, that's
not the case," but rather "Yes that's true, but so what?" ... What alternative to current
interpretive practices ought we take up?
Graff, ''Keep Off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A Reply to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 405, 413 (1982) (footnote omitted).
97. See, e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297-304 (1984) (attempting to make
concrete "Critical Legal Theory" proposals); see also Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1341-49 (1988) (suggesting that legal pragmatism is the appropriate foundation for judicial decisions and offers a workable and sensible method for developing
substantive and procedural rights).
98. As to who should be the decisionmakers in a more empathic legal system, I assume that
the argument points in the direction of multiple decisionmakers, e.g., a jury, rather than one
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workable way, these utopian objectives? Can we do more than tinker,
yet less than damn?
Even if we do fashion a new world of legal order, however, the
principle of legality will not disappear. I may embrace the concept of
empathy and the possibility of a loving law, but not escape the task of
assigning priorities among the objects of my caring.99 I may accept
that logic and meaning can be circular or "dialogic," yet eventually
need to draw lines - boundaries - around the circles in order to
end/decide a legal matter. I may recognize that the "whole" and its
"parts" are inextricably bound, yet still need some concept of the
"whole" when deciding what to do about a particular legal controversy. Some hierarchy, some linear thinking, and some emphasis on
consistent application of prior-stated standards seem unavoidable,
even in any "new-age" law. 100 Moreover, this normative and procedural inquiry must take into account existing social and legal arrangements and actual human behavior.
The guideposts for assigning our priorities are missing in the empathy literature. Indeed, they are missing from much contemporary
American legal scholarship, 101 perhaps because of the influence of the
deconstruction school of literary criticism or perhaps because guideposts of this sort are too difficult to establish or to defend. The probperson. If one's empathy hinges on one's life experience, then more peoples' input into the factfinding and law-finding process may increase the chances that the particular litigants will be
heard and understood. American Jaw reflects this hope in the sixth and seventh amendments,
which provide for jury trials, and in the concept of a trial by one's "peers." I have argued
elsewhere that the peer concept, and peer participation, are crucial aspects of our notion of a fair
jury. See Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images,
and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 547-60 (1986). Indeed, I use the word "empathy" to
describe this capacity to understand another person. Id. at 552. My conclusions about the
proper composition of the Jay jury comport with the conclusions I reach here: that is, empathic
capacity is unevenly and variously distributed among us.
99. Empathizing with another person in any robust sense requires tremendous concentration,
dedication, energy, and - most importantly - time. Taken seriously, this level of interaction
can be complex and draining, especially when the "other" is in real distress. To empathize fully
with even one other person can be all-consuming and, ultimately, unsuccessful in many ways.
Setting priorities helps us to attend adequately to some few others, rather than attend inadequately to many other$. Judges' time constraints, among other limitations, suggest they cannot
reasonably be expected to apply their hearts and minds to every litigant in any deep empathid
sense.
100. See Sherwin, supra note 39, at 603-05.
101. An exception is the work of Unger, who offers a blueprint for institutional and structural change, which he believes would further his social ideals, or "superliberalism." See, e.g.,
Unger, supra note 19, at 586-602. He defines this superliberalism as a program that
pushes the liberal premises about state and society, about freedom from dependence and
governance of social relations by the will, to the point at which they merge into a larger
ambition: the building of a social world Jess alien to a self that can always violate the generative rules of its own mental or social constructs and put other rules and other constructs in
their place.
Id. at 602.
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lem of priorities, however, has not disappeared. On the contrary, in
our complex world of shrinking resources the problem of priorities
will only grow more fierce. 102 We therefore cannot outrun the practical-moral task of distinguishing the possibilities of good from the possibilities of evil. 103
What I have concluded, based on my reading of the empathy
strand of legal scholarship, is not that the rule-of-law model is fatally
flawed or malevolent. Rather, the call to context, at its best, simply
counsels against complacency. We are admonished to revisit our experience and feelings, 104 along with other guides to reasoned judgments,
and to guard against empathic or intellectual blind spots when we construct and critique the legal institutions and standards that govern us.
Foolish formalism, they caution, is to be feared. But so too, I would
demur, is unguided emotion.
Movement in any direction involves choices. Greater receptivity
to multiple voices and a sharp awareness that our organizing principles are debatable - perhaps even hideously wrong 105 - may illumi102. Societies today are becoming more complex, with direct and troubling consequences for
law and legal theory. Niklas Luhmann identifies three reasons why this complexity has increased. First, there is a diversity of interests, groups and values within societies. Second, science and technology have increased the number of possibilities. Third, world economic systems
today are interrelated. See N. LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (1979). This last point suggests
that decentralization of legal/political authority may be an unrealistic proposal, though it might
further the goal of making law more responsive to individual or community needs.
103. I am not arguing that we can, or should ever attempt to find "an answer." I am simply
denying that all things, all results, all stories or conversations, are equal. We need context and
acontextual categories, immediate sensation and past experience, conformity to rules and ways to
escape from rules. Stories may ground us in reality and even shape that reality, but we need
some theory to make sense of our stories.
104. For an entertaining discussion of the proper role of empathy (he calls it "sympathy") in
developing moral principles, see Bennett, The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn, 49 PHILOSOPHY
123 (Apr. 1974). He concludes, as I do here, that the proper course is to "try to keep my
morality open to revision, exposing it to whatever valid pressures there are - including pressures
from my sympathies." Id. at 133.
A far more sophisticated and radical statement of the goal of opening ourselves to new forms
of meaning and justice is Roberto Unger's. See Unger, supra note 19, at 584-86.
105. I do not want to live my life, professional or personal, "in a world of broken dreams and
paper-pushing, of abstractions that have long ceased to be living theory and that, once routinized
and mutilated, turn into the guiding principles or the empty forms of social practice to which
they lend the spurious semblance of sense, authority, or necessity." Unger, supra note 19, at 670.
No one does. But neither do I want all context smashed, all order "unpacked," all received
authority ridiculed and mocked. I fear that radical skepticism about all "guiding principles" can
derail any practical effort to define or guide ourselves, as well as each other. Instead, we could
spend our time in endless imagining of alternatives to any "limiting" conception of ourselves or
others. It seems to me that we need a starting point - some framework or implicit, shared sense
of relevance - lest we live our entire lives as my friend Jerry Leavitt would put it, "playing
handball against a curtain." Moreover, anyone who has experienced times when their life's philosophy - or even some part of it - was truly "deconstructed," knows· that to face perpetual,
uninterrupted "delegitimation" of all one's assumptions and dreams would be hell on earth.
False hopes look and feel exactly like real ones, until they are dashed.
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nate our way. But we need more than a lamp for a mapless journey;
we also need a compass.

